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ernment.
Finally, the chapter raises an interesting question about the eﬃcient ex-
tent of contingent liabilities provided by government. For eﬃciency, risks
need to be distributed to those best able to manage them. Governments
may be better at managing risks when they have better information. As
noted in the chapter, this implies that governments should at least bear sov-
ereign risks, such as those associated with governments changing policy to
reap rents from large infrastructure projects. However, there is an interest-
ing question about how much sovereign risk the government should be ex-
pected to bear if private investors choose to invest in countries with gener-
allyrisky regulatory environments. In such cases, general regulation failure
acts like a general tariﬀ—and it is by no means certain that selective tariﬀ
exemptions (or regulatory guarantees) for speciﬁc projects will improve
economic eﬃciency.
Overall the chapter provides an excellent benchmark for similar studies
of other countries—although, while reading the chapter I wondered why
so much of the information it contained was not routinely issued by all gov-
ernments.
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Comment Shigeki Kunieda
Contingent liability is recognized as one of the important causes of ﬁscal
instability in developing countries. Various measures to manage contin-
gent liability and ﬁscal risk are actively discussed by international ﬁnancial
institutions and academic researchers (Brixi and Schick 2002).
The Llanto chapter provides a valuable survey on the Philippine
contingent-liability problem (especially its depth and seriousness). The pol-
icy proposals discussed in the chapter are comprehensive and consistent
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Shigeki Kunieda is an associate professor of economics at Hitotsubashi University.with the recommendations of the recent research. I agree with the general
directions of the proposals of this chapter. Here I would like to point out
two issues that might be relevant in future discussions of the Philippine
contingent-liability problem.
Limits of Risk Sharing by Governments
The previous argument of government’s guarantee provision implicitly
assumes that the government can share very large risk even if private mar-
kets cannot share the same risk. (We can call it a deep pockets view of the
government.) However, as Bulow and Summers (1984) stress in the case of
risk sharing through capital gains tax, the risk shared by the government
will be ultimately shared by its taxpayers. Then, the limits of guarantee pro-
vision by government should be determined based on the taxpayers’ capa-
bility of risk sharing. For example, while idiosyncratic risks can be spread
eﬃciently among current taxpayers, economy-wide risks are diﬃcult to be
shared among current taxpayers, since every taxpayer suﬀers the same
shocks. In some cases, temporary risks can be spread over generations by
the government, since the government has special ability to impose tax on
future generations. However, permanent risks are diﬃcult to be shared
even with diﬀerent generations, since every generation suﬀers the same
shocks. While the limits of risk sharing by governments are not so deeply
discussed in this chapter and the other research, I would like to stress that
we should take not only markets’ capability of accepting risks but also the
taxpayers’ capability of accepting risks into consideration when we discuss
the government guarantee in the Philippines or other countries.
More Active Use of Global Market Solutions
With the recent rapid development of global capital, insurance, and
commodity markets, even very large risk can be shared through private
markets now. For example, the risk surrounding the price volatility and
availability of fuel can be shared relatively easily in international markets.
With these alternative private ways for eﬃcient risk sharing, as the core
guarantee proposal in the chapter suggests, the Philippine government
should not newly guarantee fuel and other input risk. Further, while the
chapter focuses on the restrictions on new provisions of the government
guarantee, the government itself can transfer the already existing risks
guaranteed by it to private markets through some derivative and insurance
products. In order to reduce the total risk guaranteed by the Philippine
government, the transfer of the exiting risks to private markets should be
considered seriously.
However, for shifting the risk of projects themselves to global investors
directly, appropriate governance structure of the projects and suﬃcient
Dealing with Contingent Liabilities: The Philippines 287legal protection of investors are necessary. Without these conditions,
private investors prefer debt or debtlike investment supported by suﬃcient
guarantee or collateral. Thus, the importance of the establishment of the
legal and other environment providing good governance structure of proj-
ects and suﬃcient legal protection of investors should be stressed more in
the discussion of the contingent liability in the Philippines or other devel-
oping countries.
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